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“Climate Policy, Carbon Leakage, and Competitiveness: 




In this paper, analysis is presented relating to the impact of border tax adjustments for climate 
policy  on  the  international  competitiveness  of  energy-intensive  industries,  and  the  related 
problem of carbon leakage.  While many of the economic and legal issues are not particularly 
new, climate policy does present some possible twists to the analysis of border tax adjustments 
when vertically-related markets can be characterized as a successive oligopoly.  Specifically, an 
appropriate border tax adjustment will depend on the incidence of a domestic carbon tax, the 
nature of competition in upstream and downstream sectors, as well as the basis for assessing the 
trade neutrality of any border tax adjustment.  If trade neutrality is defined in terms of market 
volume,  even  though  carbon  leakage  is  reduced,  domestic  firm  competitiveness  cannot  be 
maintained.  This compares to defining trade neutrality in terms of market share, which results in 
domestic competitiveness being maintained and global carbon emissions being reduced.         
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In the past  decade, it has  become increasingly  obvious to  many observers that even though 
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change in 1997 was a useful first step, 
further efforts to develop a comprehensive multilateral agreement for reducing carbon emissions 
will be necessary if global climate change is to be properly addressed (Frankel, 2009).  However, 
irrespective of the logic supporting a multilateral approach to dealing with a global public bad, 
many countries such as the United States and the European Union (EU)  have been  actively 
pursuing national efforts to reduce carbon emissions.  
During the 110
th US Congress, at least half of the twelve climate change bills introduced by 
legislators called for some type of border measure to be targeted at energy-intensive imports, 
based upon the carbon emissions embodied in those imports (Frankel, 2009).  More specifically, 
at  the  beginning  of  2008,  separate  bills  sponsored  by  Senators  Bingaman  and  Specter,  and 
Senators Liebermann and Warner respectively, were being discussed in the US Congress, both of 
which called for a domestic cap-and-trade system targeted at carbon emissions, along with a 
requirement that importers acquire emissions allowances based on the embedded carbon in their 
goods (Houser et al., 2008).  
More recently, in the last session of Congress, The American Clean Energy and Security Act 
[H.R. 2454] sponsored by Representatives Waxman and Markey, was passed by the US House of 
Representatives  in  June  2009.
1  Like the earlier bills,   the Waxman-Markey bill contained 
provisions relating to border adju stments for US domestic climate policy.   Specifically, if no 
multilateral climate agreement existed by 2018, the President wa s mandated to implement an 
international  emissions  allowance  program,  requirements  being  imposed  on  non-exempt 
                                                 
1 A companion bill, sponsored by Senators Kerry and Boxer, was also under consideration by the US Senate in 2009
 
until it was dropped in 2010 in favor of an alternative bill, sponsored by Senators Kerry and Lieberman.  The latter 
bill was never put to the vote due to lack of Republican support.    
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importers no earlier than January 2020.    Specifically, importers in eligible industries would 
have been required to purchase an appropriate amount of emission allowances as a condition of 
entry into the United States, the border price of allowances being based on the mean of the daily 
US market price for emission allowances.
2 
  While comprehensive climate change legislation may  not come out of the current session 
of Congress, the United States itself could potentially be subject to border tax adjustments by the 
EU.  In  determ ining  its  carbon  emissions  targets  for  the  post -Kyoto  period,  the  European 
Commission  reached agreement in 2009 on revising   its previous Directive 2 003/87/EC, and 
which contained the following language:  
“… Energy-intensive industries which are determined to be exposed to significant risk of 
carbon leakage could receive up to 100% of allowances free of charge or an effective carbon 
equalization system could be introduced with a view to putting installations from the Community 
which are at a significant risk of carbon leakage and those from third countries on a comparable 
footing. Such a system could apply requirements to importers that would be no less favorable 
than those applicable to installations within the EU, for example by requiring the surrender of 
allowances…” [2008/013 COD, p.8]
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Frankel  (2009)  notes  that  the  term  “carbon  equalization”  is  consistent  with  the  kind  of 
language spelled out in the Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-Warner bills, and matches the 
several  calls  made by  French President  Nicolas Sarkozy for a  carbon tax on imports, “…A 
carbon tax at the border is the natural complement to a domestic carbon tax.  More importantly, a 
carbon tax at the border is vital for our industries and our jobs.  This has nothing to do with 
protectionism…This is about fair play…” (Financial Times, September 10, 2009). 
                                                 
2 Importers in eligible industries would have been exempt from having to purchase allowances if it were established 
that 85 percent or more of US imports of covered goods were produced in countries that met at least one of two 
criteria: (i) the country, along with the United States, were party to an international agreement to reduce GHG 
emissions, where the GHG reduction requirement were at least as stringent as those applied in the United States; (ii) 
the country had implemented domestic climate policies that increased production costs in the eligible industry by at 
least 80 percent of the cost of complying with US legislation. 
3 Directive of the European Parliament and of the COUNCIL amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and 
extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community. 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/com_2008_16_en.pdf)   
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While the principle of using border adjustments for domestic environmental policy is not a 
particularly new regulatory issue, there are potentially new challenges for economic analysis.  
Specifically,  in  setting  appropriate  border  adjustments,  it  is  important  to  account  for  the 
incidence of climate policies targeted at upstream energy production, on downstream production 
of energy-intensive goods.  Incidence of the carbon tax will be a function of factors such as 
vertical market structure, the shape of the demand curve for the final good, industry technology, 
and the nature of competition among firms producing the energy and final goods.   
In  analyzing  this  problem,  the  current  paper  is  organized  as  follows:    in  section  1,  the 
existing  literature  on  the  connection  between  trade  and  climate  policy  is  briefly  reviewed, 
followed in section 2 by a discussion of current trade law as it relates to border tax adjustments; 
in section 3, some stylized facts are presented about the type of vertically-related market most 
likely  to  be  affected  by  climate  policy,  followed  in  section  4  by  description  of  a  model  of 
successive oligopoly, which is  then  used in  section 5  to  analyze border tax adjustments  for 
domestic climate policy; finally, a summary of the paper and some conclusions are presented.              
1.  Trade and Climate Policy 
The inclusion of border measures in climate change legislation is predicated on two concerns:  
first, there will be a reduction in competitiveness of firms in industries most affected by domestic 
climate  policies;  second,  there  will  be  carbon  leakage,  i.e.,  production  by  energy-intensive 
industries will relocate to countries with less restrictive climate policies, thereby creating carbon 
havens and generating globally inefficient production of a global bad (WTO/UNEP 2009).
4 
                                                 
4 In the both US and the EU, the issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage have been explicitly linked in relation 
to the use of border measures (van Asselt and Brewer, 2010).    
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In terms of competitiveness, if a country such as the United States unilaterally implements a 
carbon tax or some type of emissions trading scheme, this will impact negatively the relative 
costs of domestic firms, which in turn will constrain their ability to compete with imports from 
other countries with less stringent climate policies.  While competitiveness of firms is a difficult 
concept to define, it would typically be thought of in terms of their ability either to maintain 
market share and/or profits.  As the WTO/UNEP (2009) report notes, the competitiveness of 
industries subject to domestic climate policies will be a function of multiple factors, including: 
first, the specific characteristics of an industry such as market structure, industry technology, the 
extent  of  import  competition,  and  the  incidence  of  any  explicit/implicit  carbon  price;  and, 
second,  the  exact  design  of  the  domestic  climate  policy;  and  the  design  of  other  countries‟ 
climate policies.       
Related to the expected impact of domestic climate policies on competitiveness is the issue 
of carbon leakage, which can be thought of as the possibility that output of energy-intensive 
industries will either increase in, or production will relocate to countries that have less restrictive 
climate policies.  Essentially, a wedge will exist between the price of carbon in countries, that 
either do not implement domestic climate policy or impose lower caps on carbon emissions, and 
countries that implement considerably tougher climate policies.  This lack of an international 
carbon price is expected to have two effects:  first, carbon havens may develop in those countries 
where  less  restrictive  climate  policies  will  attract  carbon-intensive  industries,  resulting  in 
globally inefficient production of a public bad; second, the possibility of capital flight through 
relocation  of  industries  to  countries  with  a  lower  carbon  price  will  result  in  job  losses  in 
countries with a higher carbon price.  
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Despite  these  two  issues  coming  to  the  forefront  of  the  debate  on  implementation  of 
domestic climate policy, they are not particularly new, both issues having been analyzed in the 
literature on trade and the environment.  Since the early-1990s, the connection between trade and 
environmental  policy  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable  debate  between  the  trade  policy 
community and environmentalists.  This debate was given much prominence during negotiations 
over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Esty, 1994), and  became more 
intense with completion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)  and  subsequent  formation  of  the  WTO  (Copeland  and  Taylor,  2004).  A  defining 
characteristic  of  this  debate  has  been  the  oft-expressed  concern  of  environmentalists  that 
additional competitive pressures come with the process of international economic integration.  
These pressures will result in lobbying for less stringent environmental policies, and thereby 
“regulatory chill” (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001a).  This argument is typically applied to developed 
countries where international competition may be expected to hurt domestic industries either 
through loss of market share or movement of those industries from developed countries with 
tough environmental standards to less developed countries with weaker environmental standards, 
i.e., a pollution haven effect (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). 
While the issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage are closely connected, they have 
typically been addressed separately in the environmental and international economics literatures.  
In the former, the focus is on how trade policy instruments might be used to prevent carbon 
leakage when one group of countries commits to cooperation over climate policy, while a second 
group  free-rides  by  not implementing climate  policy  (Hoel,  1994, 1996;  and Mæstad, 1997, 
2001).    For  example,  Hoel  (1994)  shows  a  social  optimum  can  be  obtained  if  cooperating 
countries set common carbon taxes, and at the same time use import tariffs (export subsidies) on  
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all traded goods, the objective being to shift the terms of trade against free-riding countries, 
thereby  reducing  carbon  leakage.    While  this  literature  does  not  explicitly  address 
competiveness,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  it  will  be  affected  via  the  use  of  trade 
instruments in the cooperating countries.  However, several authors in this literature argue that 
use of trade policy instruments could be constrained by existing WTO/GATT rules (Hoel, 1996; 
Mæstad, 1997).         
In  the  international  economics  literature,  Bagwell  and  Staiger  (2001b)  offer  an  explicit 
solution  to  the  problem  of  reduced  competitiveness  due  to  tougher  environmental  policy.  
Suppose  the  WTO/GATT  consists  of  a  two-stage  tariff  negotiation  game,  where,  before 
negotiations begin, existing environmental policies of countries are noted.
5   At the first stage of 
the game, bound tariffs are negotiated, implying a set of market access commitments by the  set 
of countries.  At the second stage of the game, countries can make unilateral changes to their mix 
of policies, providing that tariffs   do not  exceed their bound level,  implied market  access 
commitments being maintained. 
What happens  if the preferred choice of  environmental  policy  in  a sub-set of countries 
negatively affects their competitiveness, resulting in increases in the other sub-set of countries‟ 
market access in  energy-intensive goods?  In order to maintain its negotiated market access 
commitments, the first set of countries would need to raise tariffs on these products above their 
bound level, which they are unable to do under WTO/GATT rules.  Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) 
argue that resolution of this problem lies in providing more flexibility to the current rules by 
allowing countries to renegotiate their bound tariffs if unilateral changes in their environmental 
policies  increase  market  access.  While  the  problem  of  pollution  havens  is  not  addressed 
                                                 
5 While climate policy is not explicitly mentioned by Bagwell and Staiger (2001b), their key results can easily be 
adapted to include it.    
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explicitly by Bagwell and Staiger (2001b), allowing countries to renegotiate their bound tariffs 
while maintaining their market access commitments, would necessarily mitigate carbon leakage. 
2.  Border Tax Adjustments and Trade Law 
The  preceding  discussion  indicates  that  the  potential  for  climate  policies  to  increase  carbon 
leakage/negatively affect competitiveness is well-understood in the extant environmental and 
international economics literatures.  Importantly, there are theoretical arguments for the use of 
trade policy instruments in the presence of domestic climate policies.  Yet both literatures raise 
the  concern  that  existing  trade  rules  will  prevent  the  use  of  such  instruments  targeted  at 
preventing carbon leakage/maintaining competitiveness. However, the basic principle is already 
applied  with  respect to  competitiveness  in  existing  WTO/GATT rules relating  to  border tax 
adjustments (BTAs) for domestic excise taxes. 
According to WTO/UNEP (2009), a border tax (or tariff) is imposed on imported goods 
while a border tax adjustment is the imposition of a domestically imposed excise tax on like 
imported goods.  Essentially GATT Article II: 2(a) allows members of the WTO to place on the 
imports of any good, a border tax equivalent to an internal tax on the like good.  However, under 
GATT Article III: 2, the BTA cannot be applied in excess of that applied directly or indirectly to 
the like domestic good, i.e., they have to be neutral in terms of their impact on trade, their 
objective being to preserve competitive equality between domestic and imported goods (WTO, 
1997). As a consequence, any country imposing a BTA in excess of the domestic tax would be in 
contravention of GATT Article III.
6  Importantly, WTO/GATT rules on BTAs are not motivated 
                                                 
6 With respect to exported goods, WTO/GATT rules allow remission of the domestic tax on the exported good.  As 
long as the border adjustment does not exceed the level of the domestic tax, it is not regarded as an export subsidy 
under the GATT Subsidies Code (WTO, 1997).  
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by environmental concerns, but instead are supposed to ensure trade neutrality (Demaret and 
Stewardson, 1994). 
Initial discussion of the legal status of BTAs arose in the late-1960s when the US expressed 
concern that its exports to the then European Economic Community (EEC) were subject to an 
adjustment at the border for value-added tax (VAT), while at the same time VAT-free exports 
from the EEC were receiving an export subsidy.  In the event, no dispute settlement case was 
initiated through GATT by the US, and there was no negotiation over the issue in the Tokyo 
Round.   In synthesizing  analysis  of this  issue, Lockwood, de Meza and Myles  (1994)  have 
shown that movement between an origin and a destination base for VAT would have no real 
effects on trade, production and consumption.     
There is however debate among legal observers as to whether WTO/GATT rules will allow 
BTAs on specific final goods that embody energy inputs, much of the discussion focusing on the 
precise  interpretation  of  the  relevant  GATT  Articles  (WTO/UNEP,  2009).    The  language 
contained in GATT Article II.2 (a) is interpreted as restricting BTAs to inputs that are physically 
incorporated  into  the  final  good,  thereby  precluding  their  application  to  imported  energy-
intensive final goods.   In contrast, the language contained in GATT Article III.2 is interpreted as 
allowing BTAs to be applied to inputs such as energy used in the production process of the final 
good.  Claims of legal precedent for the latter appeal to the 1987 Superfund case involving the 
US, where a GATT Panel ruled that a BTA levied on imported substances that were the end-
products of certain chemicals taxed in the US, was equivalent to the tax borne by like domestic 
substances, and therefore consistent with GATT Article III.2 (GATT, 1987).
7  
                                                 
7 In 1989/90, a tax was imposed in the US of a range of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and a BTA was also applied to 
the import of such chemicals, as well as the import of manufactured products that either contain CFCs or use them in 
their production process (Barthold, 1994).   To date no WTO ruling has been rendered on this BTA.  
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It should be noted that even if a border tax adjustment for domestic climate policy is deemed 
inconsistent  with  GATT  Article  III:  2,  there  has  been  extensive  legal  several  discussion  of 
whether it may still be possible to justify it under the environmental exceptions of GATT Article 
XX (General Exceptions).
8  Ultimately while legal clarity on this issue can only be settled by a 
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, the remainder of the paper proceeds upon the assumption that 
BTAs applied to energy-intensive imports will be allowed under the WTO/GATT rules. 
3.  Climate Policy and Energy-Intensive Industries 
The burden of domestic climate policy is expected to fall mostly on import-competing, energy-
intensive manufacturing industries in the developed countries.  Consequently, an important part 
of figuring out any appropriate border adjustments involves establishing those industries that are 
most vulnerable to the unilateral implementation of climate policy.  In the case of the US, Houser 
et al. (2009) identify five energy-intensive industries most likely to be affected by domestic 
climate policy:  steel, aluminum, chemicals, paper and cement, with net imports accounting for 
19, 59, 6, 10 and 25 percent of domestic demand respectively.
9  A similar set of industries have 
been discussed with respect to EU concerns about carbon leakage (Monjon and Quirion, 2010). 
How should BTAs be applied to this particular set of industries?  If both energy and carbon-
intensive final goods markets are perfectly competitive, then the appropriate treatment of imports 
of  a  energy-intensive  good  such as aluminum  is  relatively straightforward (see Poterba and 
Rotemberg, 1995): an import tax on imported aluminum  equal to the level of the  carbon tax 
times the extent to which  energy enters the cost function for  domestically produced aluminum, 
                                                 
8  For example, see Goh (2004) and Pauwelyn (2007). 
9  Interestingly, Canada is the largest source of US imports for all of these industries, with the exception of 
chemicals, and China is only a major import competitor in the case of cement.  It should be noted, however, that 
over the past fifteen years, the share of energy-intensive US imports from developing countries has been increasing 
Houser et al. (2009).  
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would raise marginal costs for the importer of aluminum by the same amount, and consequently 
will have a neutral effect on imports of aluminum, and thereby be WTO/GATT-consistent.   
It may be more appropriate, however, to assume that both the energy and energy-intensive 
final  goods  markets  are  oligopolistic.  In  the  case  of  electricity  markets,  with  increased 
deregulation  it is  now quite commonplace to  characterize generating firms  in  terms  of their 
oligopolistic interaction (Ventosa et al., 2005).  For example, Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), 
and Fowlie (2009) both model the Californian electricity market as a Cournot game, while Bolle 
(1992), Green and Newberry (1992), and Green (1996) all model the UK electricity market as a 
supply function equilibrium, the upper bound to which is the static Cournot outcome.
10  With 
respect  to  the   set  of  energy -intensive  industries,  several  authors  analyzing  the 
competitiveness/carbon leakage issue have already modeled firm behavior as  oligopolistic, e.g., 
steel (Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Ritz, 2009) and cement (Ponssard and Walker, 2008), and 
there is also empirical evidence that firms in these industries may behave less than competitively, 
e.g., steel (Gallett, 1996); aluminum ( Yang, 2001); paper (Mei and Sun, 2008);  and cement 
(Azzam and Rosenbaum, 2001). 
Consequently, if the vertical market structure of these industries is best described as one of 
successive oligopoly, then  taxing imports of  energy-intensive goods at the same level as the 
carbon tax imposed on  energy production may  not  have a non-neutral impact.  In order to 
analyze this possibility, the remainder of the paper consists of the adaptation and use of a model 
developed in two earlier papers by McCorriston and Sheldon (2005a; 2005b). 
 
 
                                                 
10  Other  examples  include  Andersson  and  Bergman  (1995),  Chen  and  Hobbs  (2005),  Puller  (2007),  Bushnell, 
Mansur and Saravia (2008), and Hortaçsu and Puller (2008).   
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4.  A Model of Successive Oligopoly 
Assumptions 
The model introduced here is one of successive oligopoly, i.e., both the upstream (intermediate) 
and  downstream  (final)  sectors  are  imperfectly  competitive,  and  one  that  is  standard  when 
dealing with policy issues in vertically-related markets (for example, Sleuwaegen et al., 1998; 
Ishikawa and Spencer, 1999).  In the downstream sector, the domestic firm competes with a 
foreign exporter of the energy-intensive good.  In both domestic and foreign upstream sectors, 
two  firms  produce  a  non-traded  intermediate  input,  electricity,  which  is  homogenous  once 
generated and supplied to the electricity transmission system.  Production of electricity generates 
carbon emissions e via the function ()
U
jj e g x  , where
U
j x is total upstream electricity production 
in countries j =1, 2, where 1 refers to the home country and 2 the foreign country, ( ) 0
U
j gx    and 
we  can  allow  for 21 ( ) ( )
UU g x g x   ,  capturing  the  idea  that  the  foreign  country‟s  electricity 
production generates more carbon emissions ej for a given level of output.  A domestic carbon 
tax will raise domestic intermediate firms‟ costs subsequently raising the domestic downstream 
firm‟s costs due to the increased price of electricity.  The technology linking each sector is one of 
fixed proportions.  Formally, 
U
jj xx  , j = 1, 2, where xj and xj
U represent output in both the 
domestic and foreign downstream and upstream sectors respectively, where superscript U denotes 
the  upstream  sector,  and  where    is  the  constant  coefficient  of  production.  To  ease  the 
exposition,  is set equal to one in the framework outlined below.  Like much of the previous 
literature on vertical markets, arm‟s length pricing between the downstream and upstream sectors  
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is  also  assumed,  i.e.,  the  downstream  sector  takes  electricity  prices  as  given  (Abiru,  1988; 
Salinger, 1988).
11 
Following Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), the model consists of a three -stage game.  At the 
first stage, the domestic government commits to a carbon tax and a BTA, while the second and 
third stages consist of Nash equilibria in the upstream and downstream sectors. The timing of the 
firm‟s strategy choice goes from upstream to downstream.  Specifically, given costs and the 
derived demand curve facing the upstream sector, upstream firms simultaneously choose output 
to maximize profits, which generates Nash equilibrium in the upstream sector.  The intermediate 
input prices are taken as given by the domestic downstream firm which, simultaneously with 
their foreign competitor, chooses their output to maximize profits, thus giving Nash equilibrium 
in the downstream sector. In terms of solving the model, equilibrium in the downstream sector is 
derived first and then the upstream sector.  In addition, all equilibria are sub-game perfect. 
Equilibrium in the Energy-Intensive Sector 
Let x1 equal the output choice of the domestic downstream firm and x2 the output choice of its 
foreign competitor.  The revenue functions can be written as: 
  1 1 2 ( , ) R x x         (1) 
  2 1 2 ( , ) R x x .      (2) 
We assume downward sloping demands and substitute final goods. 
Given (1) and (2), the relevant profit functions downstream are given as: 
 
  1 1 1 2 1 1 ( , )  = R  x x  - c x    (3) 
  2 2 1 2 2 2 ( , )- , = R   x x    c x    (4) 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that we assume that there is no bargaining over upstream prices. This is a common assumption 
in models of successive oligopoly.  Adapting a rationale for this provided by Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) it is 
assumed  that  the  upstream  electricity-producing  firms  sell  to  a  large  number  of  different  downstream  sectors, 
reducing any monopsony power one individual downstream sector may have.  
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where c1 and c2 are the domestic and foreign firms‟ respective costs.  Firms‟ costs relate to the 
purchase of the intermediate input electricity, other costs being omitted as arguments. 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are given as: 
 
  1,1 1 R  = c   (5) 
      2,2 2 R  = c ,  (6) 
 
Equilibrium in the downstream sector can be derived by totally differentiating the first-order 




 R     R         dx dc
     =    .
R   R       dx dc
    
    
    
                      (7) 
 







R dx  = r =    
R dx





R dx  =   =   . r
R dx
                           (9) 
 
With  this  set-up,  we  can  deal  with  both  strategic  substitutes  and  strategic  complements 
where  the  variable  of  interest  is  the  cross-partial  effect  on  marginal  profitability,  i.e., 
i  i,ij sign  sign  rR  .  Consequently, with reference to equation (8) and (9), if i,ij  i  0,then  0 Rr  . In 
this case, we have the case of strategic substitutes, and the reaction functions are downward 
sloping. However, if i,ij  0 R  , the reaction functions are upward sloping and we have strategic 
complements.  The  distinction  between  strategic  substitutes/complements  relates  to  the 
“aggressiveness”  of  firm‟s  strategies  (Bulow  et  al.  1985).  With  strategic  substitutes,  firms‟ 
strategies  are  less  aggressive  than  those  associated  with  strategic  complements,  i.e.,  with  
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strategic  substitutes  (complements),  an  increase  in  the  output  of  firm  1  would  be  met  by  a 
decrease (increase) in that of firm 2.
12  
Given (7), the solution to the system is found by re-arranging in terms of dxi and inverting 
where  is the determinant of the left-hand side of (7): 
 
11 2,22 1,12 1
22 2,21 1,11
-    R      R      dx dc
 =       .
R    R    dx dc
     
           
                  (10) 
 
To simplify the notation re-write (10) as: 
 
1 2 1 1 1
2 2 1 2
,
-         dx a b dc
 =        
        dx b a dc
     
      
     
             (11) 
where:  1 1,11 2 2,22 a = R   a  = R , and  1 1,12 2 2,21. b = R    b  = R    
For stability of the duopoly equilibrium, the diagonal of the matrix has to be negative, i.e., 
i < 0  a ,  and  the  determinant  positive,  i.e.,    1 2 1  2     1     0 a a rr     .    Given  these  conditions, 
further  comments  can  be  made  about  the  reaction  functions.    i i i / r b a   from  (8) and (9).  
Hence, if  i < 0  a , then for strategic substitutes,  i < 0  b , in order to satisfy  i < 0  r , and  i > 0  b  in 
order to satisfy  i > 0  r  for strategic complements.  The expression for  i r  can be substituted into 
(11) in order to make the comparative statics easier to follow: 
 
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 2
.
-          dx a a dc r
 =        
         dx a a dc r
     
      
     
                 (12) 
 
 
                                                 
12 Whether we have strategic substitutes or complements in quantity space depends on the second derivatives of the 




Equilibrium in the Electricity Generating Sector 
Given the fixed proportions technology and  1 , total output in either the domestic or foreign 
electricity  generating  sectors  is  given  by  
U
jj xx  .    The  latter  also  implies  that  upstream 
emissions  can  be  written  directly  as  function  of  the  downstream  firm‟s  output,  i.e., 
( ) ( )
U
j j j e g x g x  . It is assumed that in each country there are two upstream firms (A and B) 
whose combined output of electricity equals 
U
j x , i.e.,
A B U
j j j x x x .  Due to the intermediate 
good  electricity  being  assumed  homogeneous  once  supplied  to  the  transmission  system, the 
downstream firms are therefore indifferent about the relative proportions of 
A
j x and 
B
j x used in its 
production process.  Assuming that the downstream firms face no costs other than the price paid 
for electricity, the inverse derived demand function facing firms in the upstream sector can be 
found by substituting 
U
i p for  i c  in (5) and (6) respectively. In countries j = 1, 2, firms‟ profits in 
the upstream sector are, therefore, given by: 
()
AB A AA A
j jj jj j   =      x , x   -     x c R                       (13)  
( ) ,
AB B BB B




j c and 
B
j c are the upstream firms‟ costs respectively in country j.  
Given this, following the outline above, equilibrium in the upstream market, j = 1, 2, is: 
 
1 ( ) ,
A B A A A
j j j j j U
j B B A B B
j j j j j
dx a a dc r   =               
dx a a dc r
      
      
     
                (15) 
where  ,0
AB
jj aa , and 
1 ( ) 0
U
j





5.  Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments and Neutrality 
Carbon Taxes and Leakage 
Assume initially that the domestic government can only target a carbon tax 
e t at its electricity 
producers.
13  The imposition of the  carbon tax 
e t on domestic electricity producers raises both 
1
A c and 1
B c .  In turn, this raises the price of electricity, i.e., the costs to the domestic downstream 
firm 1 c .  The cost increase to the domestic downstream firm also affects imports of the energy-
intensive final good, given by 21 / dx dc .  Following Ritz (2009) and Karp (2010), and assuming 
that domestic electricity producers do not respond to the carbon tax 
e t by reducing their intensity 
of carbon emissions via cleaner technology, carbon leakage l is given as: 








de g x dx
l
de g x dx
 
    
,                (16)  
i.e., even if intensity of carbon emissions is the same in the domestic and foreign upstream 
sectors, 21 ( ) ( )
UU g x g x   there will be positive carbon leakage, l >0, if there is positive output 
leakage,  21 /0
UU dx dx  .  Given that  
U
jj xx  , (12) can be used to re-write (16) as: 
          
1
2 2 2 2 1
1
1 1 2 1
()
..
( ) ( )
U
U
de g x a r dc
l




      
                       (17) 
If l > 0, there is positive carbon leakage, and if l < 0, there is negative carbon leakage in the 
sense that foreign carbon emissions actually decrease after implementation of the policy.  Given 
1 0
  and  2 0 a  , such that
1
1 2 1 0 dx   a dc
   , the direction of carbon leakage is given by the 
sign of r2, and the extent by the size of 2 ()
U gx  relative to 1 ()
U gx  : if  21 ( ) ( )
UU g x g x   and r2 < 0 (> 
                                                 





2 2 2 1 0( 0) dx  =   a r dc
     and l > 0 (< 0), i.e., there is positive (negative) carbon leakage 
if final goods are strategic substitutes (complements); and if  21 ( ) ( )
UU g x g x   , given  2 1 r  the 
extent  of  positive  (negative)  carbon  leakage  depends  on  the  intensity  of  foreign  relative  to 
domestic carbon emissions. 
LEMMA  1:  With  strategic  substitutes,  a  carbon  tax  causes  positive  carbon  leakage.  With 
strategic complements, a carbon tax causes negative carbon leakage. The extent of positive or 
negative carbon leakage is determined by the relative intensity of foreign to domestic carbon 
emissions.  
Border Tax Adjustments and Neutrality 
Now assume a BTA 
b t can be targeted at imports of the energy-intensive final good,   thereby 
raising the costs of the downstream firm‟s foreign competitor which, in turn affects the level of 
imports.  This is given by 22 / dx dc , which given the assumption of fixed proportions, also feeds 
back into foreign electricity production,  
 
2 2  2 2 2 2 2 / =  /  =  /
U A B dx dc dx dc d x x dc  , which in turn 
affects  foreign  carbon  emissions  2 e ,  and  thereby  carbon  leakage l.  Since  the  WTO/GATT 
guidelines are not specific in defining „competitive equality‟, we consider the cases where the 
neutral BTA (neutral BTA) is defined as either the change in  2 c  that keeps the volume of final 
good imports constant given the environmental tax 
e t , or as the change in  2 c that keeps the 
domestic market share of final good imports constant given 
e t .   
Import-Volume Neutrality 







e  /    dx dc t  neutral BTA=     
-   / dx dc




When  markets  are  competitive,  then 2 2 2 1 // dx dc dx dc  ,  the  net  effect  being  such  that
2 0 dx  , there being no carbon leakage, i.e., the appropriate BTA should be set equal to the 
domestic carbon tax.  Specifically, with a domestic carbon tax
e t , the BTA is effectively based 
on the carbon embodied in the domestically produced final good. This, rules out the domestic 
policymaker  setting  t
b  >  t
e  when 21 ( ) ( )
UU g x g x   ,  i.e.,  given  binding  WTO/GATT  rules,  the 
appropriate BTA cannot be based on the carbon embodied in the foreign produced final good.
14   
In  contrast,  when  markets  are  imperfectly  competitive,  setting  the  BTA  equal  to  the 
domestic carbon tax will lead to a non-neutral outcome,  2 0 dx  . 
LEMMA 2: With strategic substitutes, the appropriate import policy to ensure neutrality is an 
import tax. With strategic complements, import volume neutrality requires an import subsidy. 
Consider first of all the effect of the import tax on the imports of the final good.  Using (12),
1
2 1 2 dx  = a dc  
  ,  since 
1 0
 and  1 0 a  ,  the  border  tax  (as  expected)  reduces  the  level  of 
imports,  i.e.,  2 0 dx  .  From  the  previous  section,  the  effect  of  the  domestic  carbon  tax  on 
imports 
1
2 2 2 1 dx  =  a r dc
   depends on the sign of 2 r .  In the case of strategic substitutes, 2 0 r  , 
which results in  21 /0 dx dc  , i.e., import volume neutrality requires an import tax.  Necessarily, 
if 2 0 dx  there will be no carbon leakage.  
In the case of strategic complements r2 > 0, so that 21 /0 dx dc  , suggesting that the carbon 
tax  has  a  non-neutral  impact  on  imports  of  the  final  good,  as  it  further  reduces  imports.  
                                                 
14 Mattoo et al. (2009) have provided some empirical estimates of the likely impact of BTAs by OECD countries, 
given  a  carbon  tax  designed  to  reduce  emissions  by  17%  by  2020.      Key  to  their  analysis  is  the  assumption 
concerning the basis for BTAs on final goods, with two choices being modeled:  BTAs based either on (i) the carbon 
content embodied in final goods produced in the importing country, or (ii) the carbon content embodied in the 
imported goods, the latter option broadly matching provisions of the Waxman-Markey Bill.  Given production in 
countries such as China is more carbon-intensive than in OECD countries, choice (ii) implies BTAs of up to 25%, 
with China‟s exports of energy-intensive goods forecast to fall by 43%.  By contrast, choice (i) implies border tax 
adjustments ranging up to 8%, with China‟s exports of energy-intensive goods forecast to fall by 6%.  
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Specifically, the carbon tax imposed on domestic electricity production reduces domestic output 
in the downstream sector and imports of the final good. In principle, from (18) this implies that 
with strategic complements, since 21 /0 dx dc  , to restore neutrality, the appropriate policy is an 
import subsidy rather than an import tax.  However, this result can probably best be regarded as a 
theoretical curiosum due to the fact that an import subsidy would likely be politically infeasible.  
Of course, in terms of carbon leakage, an import subsidy is actually unnecessary due to the fact 
that the domestic carbon tax, by causing the foreign downstream firm to reduce their output, 
generates negative carbon leakage.  
 The appropriate border tax adjustment for a domestic carbon tax that ensures import volume 
neutrality is summarized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1: The BTA required to ensure import volume neutrality depends on (a) whether 
the nature of competition is strategic substitutes or complements; (b) the effect of a change in 
costs in the final market; and (c) the extent to which the domestic carbon tax, t
e, is transmitted 
into an increase in domestic downstream firm’s costs. 
Part (a) of Proposition 1 follows directly from Lemma 2. Relating to parts (b) and (c), whether 
the expansion of imports matches the contraction due to the BTA depends on two factors: the 
effect of the change in costs on the downstream sector, and the extent to which the domestic 
carbon tax,
e t , is transmitted into an increase in the downstream firm‟s costs,  1 dc .  Focusing, first 
of all, on the former, even if 12 dc dc  , the impact of the domestic carbon tax will likely be less 
than the BTA.  For example, if 12 aa  , as 2 1 r  , then 2 2 1 a r a  .  Second, consider the likelihood 
of 12 dc dc  .  This depends on the incidence of the carbon tax on the downstream firm‟s cost 
function, i.e.,  1,1 1 1 /( )
U A B dp dc dc  the extent to which the price of domestic energy rises as a result 
of  the  domestic  carbon  tax.    Since  electricity  is  homogenous  at  the  point  of  consumption 
downstream, then:  
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  11 1 1,1( ).
UU AB   =        +      dp p dx dx                        (19) 
Using (15):     
     
1
1 1,1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,1 ( ) [ (1 ) (1 )] { } ,
U U U A B B B A A U e dp p dc a r dc a r p D t
                   (20) 
where 1,1 0
U p  ,  and 
1
1111 ( ) [ (1 ) (1 )] 0
U B B A A D a r a r
       .    Therefore,  domestic  downstream 
costs will increase with imposition of a carbon tax upstream, i.e.,  11 0
U dc dp  . For reasonable 
characterizations  of  the  demand  function,  there  will  be  under-shifting  of  the  carbon  tax
1,1 { } 1
Ue p D t  .
15   
Using (12), and (18)-(20), the appropriate BTA implied by Proposition 1 can generally be 
given as (assuming a1a2): 
      2 1,1 2 1 { } .
Ue neutral BTA  = r p D t r  dc  
                                       
(21) 
It is clear that the form of the BTA, i.e., whether it is an import tax or subsidy, depends on 
the nature of competition in the downstream sector.
16  Further, the size of the appropriate  BTA 
depends on the nature of competition in both the downstream and upstream  sectors.  Also, note 
that if the appropriate BTA is set, i.e., 2 0 dx  , there will be no carbon leakage.  As noted earlier, 
the BTA cannot be used to target foreign production when 21 ( ) ( )
UU g x g x   as this would violate 
the import-volume neutrality constraint.    
Import-Share Neutrality 
In the case of import-share neutrality, the appropriate BTA is defined as one where the net effect 
of the carbon tax t
e on x1 and x2 must equal the net effect of the BTA on x1 and x2. In this case, the 
neutral BTA is defined as: 
                                                 
15 For example, a linear, or more generally a weakly convex demand function will generate under-shifting. 
16 Note that including the upstream sector generalizes the impact of the domestic carbon tax and hence what the 
appropriate BTA should be. If the upstream sector were perfectly competitive, then the incidence of the carbon tax 
in the upstream sector would not matter. In this case  1 1 dc   the neutral BTA being equal to 2 r  .    
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2 1 1 1
1 2 2 2
[( ) ( )]
,
[( ) ( )]
e  dx / dc  +   dx / dc t neutral BTA = 
dx / dc  +  dx / dc
                      (22) 
PROPOSITION 2: Defining competitive equality in terms of market share leads to a policy that 
does not depend on the existence of strategic substitutes or complements. However, the BTA 
required  will  be  lower  in  the  strategic  complement  case  compared  to  that  required  for  the 
strategic substitute case. 
 
Using (23) and assuming 12 aa  , the neutral BTA can be re-written as: 
 
       
2 2 1
11
( 1) ( 1)
.
( 1) ( 1)
e r  +  t   r  +   dc  
neutral BTA =    
r +  r + 
                 (23) 
 
It is clear from (23) that defining „competitive equality‟ in terms of market shares does not 
lead to the „sign‟ of the policy. However, the magnitude of the BTA is still dependent on the 
nature  of  competition  between  the  downstream  firms.    Specifically,  in  the  case  of  strategic 
substitutes, 0 i r  ,  and  given  that 12 rr  ,  the  appropriate  BTA  exceeds  that  for  the  case  of 
import-volume neutrality  as  given in  (21).
17 For strategic complements, 0 i r  , and given that
12 rr  , the neutral BTA is lower than in the strategic substitutes case.  However, whether final 
goods are strategic substitutes or complements, the domestic carbon tax combined with the BTA 
“facilitates” collusion, a result similar to that when import restrictions are defined in terms of 
market share (Denicolo and Garella, 1999).  As a result, global carbon emissions are actually 
reduced below that prior to implementation of the domestic carbon tax. 
Border Tax Adjustments and Competitiveness 
While appropriate BTAs that ensure trade neutrality can be defined in the presence of imperfect 
competition,  thereby  ensuring  no  carbon  leakage,  the  downstream  output  and  profit 
                                                 
17 This assumption relates to the relative slopes of the reaction functions, implying that firm 1‟s reaction function is 
steeper, in absolute terms than that of firm 1, which is necessary to ensure stability of equilibrium.  
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(competitiveness)  effects  of  the  two  definitions  of  neutrality  are  quite  different.
18    This  is 
important since even though the appropriate BTA will keep imports of the final good at the same 
level, re-distribution of output and profits between domestic and foreign downstream firms can 
still occur.  This can be summarized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3: With import volume neutrality, an appropriate BTA for a domestic carbon tax 
has the potential to reduce output and profits of the domestic downstream firm, thereby reducing 
its competitiveness, while increasing the profits of the foreign downstream firm. With the import 
share rule, the domestic downstream firm maintains its competitiveness in terms of market share, 
and both domestic and foreign downstream firms gain additional profits. 
Specifically,  under  import-volume  neutrality,  and  for  either  strategic  substitutes  or 
complements, the combination of domestic carbon tax and BTA reduces output and profits of the 
domestic downstream firm, and raises profits of the foreign downstream firm. Under the rule that
2 0 dx  ,  the  change  in  output  of  the  domestic  downstream  firm  is  derived from  (12),  and 
assuming 12 a a a : 
         
1
1 1 1 2 ( ). dx a dc rdc
                  (24)  
Given
1
12 0, 0, a dc dc
     , and 1 1 r  , then  1 0 dx  for both  1 0 r  and 1 0 r  , i.e., even if the 
BTA is trade neutral, the domestic firm still reduces its output with a carbon tax.  In the case of 
profits, totally differentiate (3) and (4):  
              
1 1 1,1 1 1,2 2 1 1 1, 1 π =   +     -   + π c d R dx R dx cdx dc                       (25) 
              
2 2 2,2 2 2,1 1 2 2 2, 2 π  +     -   + π c d = R dx R dx c dx dc                    (26) 
                                                 
18 While this discussion is concerned only with output/profit-shifting as a by-product of border tax adjustments in 
the presence of carbon taxes, there is a literature on the explicit use of environmental policy as strategic trade policy, 
e.g., Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994) and Ulph (1996).  
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Again, based on the rule that 2 0 dx  , and
1 1, 1 1 1 c dc xdc    from (3), it is easy to see that
1 π < 0 d , i.e., domestic downstream firm profits fall.  For the foreign downstream firm, and 
assuming, 12 a a a , (26) can be re-written as: 
     
2
1
2 2,1 1 2, 2 2 1 1 2 2 2,1 π π [ ( )- ].
-




2,1 0, 0, 0, pa
     and 1 0, r  as long as  .0  , then 2 π > 0 d , i.e., foreign downstream 
firm profits increase.  The reason for this is that the BTA has been set appropriately and is less 
than the domestic carbon tax.  If 1 0 r  , and an import subsidy is used, as can be seen from (25),
1 π < 0 d , i.e., the domestic downstream firm‟s profits still decline.  In the case of the foreign 
downstream  firm,  from  (27),  as  long  as  1 1 2 , dc rdc  and  .0  ,  then 2 π > 0 d ,  i.e.,  the 
downstream foreign firm‟s profits increase.  In the case where an import subsidy is not used due 
to  its  political  infeasibility,  from  (25)  and  (27),  it  can  be  seen  that  these  profit  effects  are 
reinforced.      
In the case of import-share neutrality, the combination of the carbon tax and BTA increases 
the profits of both the domestic and foreign downstream firms in both the strategic substitutes 
and  complements  cases.  In  order  to  see  this,  first  derive 1 dx and 2 dx from  (12),  assuming
12 a a a , and substituting in for  2 dx from (23): 







- r +   
dx =     a dc    +r 
  r +   
  
         
                               (28) 







- r +   
dx =    a dc r +     
  r +   
  
         
                               (29) 
As
1
1 0, 0, 0 a dc
     ,  and  for  strategic  substitutes,  0 i r  ,  then  1 0 dx  and 2 0 dx  .    For 
strategic complements, 0 i r  , so again,  1 0 dx   and  2 0 dx  .  
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Substituting (28) and (29) into (25) and (26): 
          
1 2





- r + 
d = x dc  a  r  +   -  p
r + 
   
   
   
                            (30) 
         
1 2
2 2 1 1 2 2,1
1
1
π 1 (1 ) .
1
- r + 
d = x      adc    +  +r      - dc   p
r + 
   
   
   
                     (31) 
For strategic substitutes, 0 i r  , and in addition, in (30), 
1
1,2 0, 0, 0, pa
     and  . 0,  while in 
(31), 
1
2,1 0, 0, 0, pa
      and  . 0,  .  Therefore, as long as  
1
1,2 .1 pa
  in (30), and also that

1
2,1 1 2 . p adc dc
  in (31), then it follows that 1 π > 0 d , and 2 π > 0 d .  The same holds for strategic 
complements. 
These output and profit effects are illustrated in figure 1 for the case of final goods being 
strategic substitutes, where the initial Nash equilibrium is N.  With a domestic carbon tax t
e 
upstream being passed through to downstream as 1 dc , the new Nash equilibrium at N* results in 
the foreign downstream firm increasing both its output and profits at the expense of the domestic 
downstream firm, i.e., there is a loss in the latter‟s competitiveness.   However, in the case of 
import-volume neutrality, the combination of 1 dc and the BTA t
b' shifts less output and profits 
away from the domestic to the foreign downstream firm.  The pass-through of the carbon tax in
1 dc  shifts the domestic downstream firm‟s reaction function from F1 to F1', output falling to x1', 
and the BTA shifts the foreign downstream firm‟s reaction function from F2 to F2', the new Nash 
equilibrium  being  N',  such  that  the  foreign  downstream  firm‟s  output  remains  at  x2  =  x2'.  
However, even with a trade neutral BTA, the domestic downstream firm still loses market share, 
and its profits fall to π1', while the foreign downstream firm‟s profits increase to π2'.  As per 
Proposition 1, the BTA is less than the domestic carbon tax, due to the carbon tax not being fully  
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passed through by the domestic electricity generating firm in terms of an increase in the energy 
costs of the domestic firm producing the final good. 
For import-share neutrality, the new Nash equilibrium is N'', the combination of 1 dc  and the 
BTA t
b'' results in profits of the domestic downstream firm increasing to π1'', and the profits of 
the foreign downstream firm increasing to π2'', their market shares remaining constant along 
x2/(1-x2).  In terms of political economy, the domestic downstream firm will lobby for trade 
neutrality  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  market-share  as  it  maintains  both  its  competitiveness 
measured by market share, and increases its profits by moving into the Pareto-superior profit set 
bounded by the iso-profit contours π1 and π2. In contrast, its foreign competitor would prefer 
trade neutrality to be defined in terms of market-volume where it maintains its exports, and earns 
higher profits, moving the domestic downstream firm outside of the Pareto-superior profit set.  
Of course, in either case, even though trade neutrality and no carbon leakage are ensured, the 
aggregate  reduction  in  output  of  the  final  good  generates  a  deadweight  loss  to  consumers.  
Minimizing the costs of the latter distortion would necessarily have to be taken into account if 
the carbon tax were being set optimally.
19 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, analysis has been presented relating to the impact of border tax adjustments for 
climate policy on the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, and the related 
problem of carbon leakage.  While many of the economic and legal issues are not particularly 
new, climate policy does present some possible twists to the analysis of border tax adjustments 
when vertically-related markets can be characterized as a successive oligopoly.  Specifically, an 
appropriate border tax adjustment will depend on the incidence of a domestic carbon tax, the 
                                                 
19 For example, see Conrad (1996) for a discussion of optimal environmental taxes in an oligopoly setting with a 
global public bad.  
26 
 
nature of competition in upstream and downstream sectors, as well as the basis for assessing the 
trade neutrality of any border tax adjustment.    If trade neutrality is defined in terms of market 
volume,  even  though  carbon  leakage  is  avoided,  domestic  firm  competitiveness  cannot  be 
maintained.  This compares to defining trade neutrality in terms of market share, which results in 
both domestic competitiveness being maintained and global carbon emissions being reduced.  
Given these results, incorporating an explicit political economy dimension into the model would 
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